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AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION:  
LAW AND ECONOMICS’ TOPICS OF INVENTION AND 
ARRANGEMENT AND TROPES OF STYLE 
 
Michael D. Murray* 
Abstract 
The Great Recession of 2008 and onward has drawn attention to the 
American economic and financial system, and has cast a critical 
spotlight on the theories, policies, and assumptions of the modern, 
neoclassical school of law and economics—often labeled the "Chicago 
School"—because this school of legal economic thought has had great 
influence on the American economy and financial system.  The Chicago 
School's positions on deregulation and the limitation or elimination of 
oversight and government restraints on stock markets, derivative 
markets, and other financial practices are the result of decades of 
neoclassical economic assumptions regarding the efficiency of 
unregulated markets, the near-religious-like devotion to a hyper-
simplified conception of rationality and self-interest with regard to the 
persons and institutions participating in the financial system, and a 
conception of laws and government policies as incentives and costs in a 
manner that excludes the actual conditions and complications of reality. 
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This Article joins the critical conversation on the Great Recession 
and the role of law and economics in this crisis by examining 
neoclassical and contemporary law and economics from the perspective 
of legal rhetoric.  Law and economics has developed into a school of 
contemporary legal rhetoric that provides topics of invention and 
arrangement and tropes of style to test and improve general legal 
discourse in areas beyond the economic analysis of law.  The rhetorical 
canons of law and economics—mathematical and scientific methods of 
analysis and demonstration; the characterization of legal phenomena as 
incentives and costs; the rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and 
rational choice theory as corrected by modern behavioral social 
sciences, cognitive studies, and brain science—make law and economics 
a persuasive method of legal analysis and a powerful school of 
contemporary legal rhetoric, if used in the right hands. 
My Article is the first to examine the prescriptive implications of the 
rhetoric of law and economics for general legal discourse as opposed to 
examining the benefits and limitations of the economic analysis of law 
itself.  This Article advances the conversation in two areas: first, as to 
the study and understanding of the persuasiveness of law and economics, 
particularly because that persuasiveness has played a role in influencing 
American economic and financial policy leading up to the Great 
Recession; and second, as to the study and understanding of the use of 
economic topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of style in 
general legal discourse when evaluated in comparison to the other 
schools of classical and contemporary legal rhetoric.  I examine each of 
the rhetorical canons of law and economics and explain how each can be 
used to create meaning, inspire imagination, and improve the 
persuasiveness of legal discourse in every area of law.  My conclusion is 
that the rhetorical canons of law and economics can be used to create 
meaning and inspire imagination in legal discourse beyond the economic 
analysis of law, but the canons are tools that only are as good as the 
user, and can be corrupted in ways that helped to bring about the current 
economic crisis.   
INTRODUCTION 
Law and economics is persuasive.  The Great Recession1 is one 
by-product of the law and economics movement’s ability to 
                                                 
1
  I take the name, “Great Recession,” from none other than Nobel Laureate 
Professor Joseph Stiglitz, who recently discounted decades of neoclassical 
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persuade lawyers, legislators, and government officials to 
deregulate and remove restraints so as to allow a largely 
uninhibited operation of the financial markets and banking 
system.2 The discipline of law and economics has its admirers and 
                                                                                                             
economic assumptions when he pointed out that “markets do not work well on 
their own” and that in the recent recession, the United States suffered because 
the economy lost its “balance between the role of markets and the role of 
government.”  JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND 
THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY xii (2010). 
2
  Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 619 (2001) (“In its 
more extreme forms, law and economics solutions to problems of human 
behavior were paraded as “science” (not as social science but as “science”), the 
findings of which were unassailable. Those who questioned were made to 
appear ignorant or foolish.”); Timothy A. Canova, The Failing Bubble 
Economy: American Exceptionalism and the Crisis in Legitimacy, 102 AM. 
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 237, 238 (2008) (“Lawyers and legal scholars have tended 
not to question the economic assumptions of orthodox economic models”); 
Timothy A. Canova, Legacy of the Clinton Bubble, DISSENT, Summer 2008, at 
41; Chunlin Leonhard, Subprime Mortgages and the Case for Broadening the 
Duty of Good Faith, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 621, 622 (2011); Lawrence E. Mitchell, 
The Morals of the Marketplace: A Cautionary Essay for Our Time, 20 STAN. L. 
& POL'Y REV. 171, 173 (2009); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Board as a Path to 
Corporate Responsibility, in Doreen McBarnet, THE NEW CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY (2007).  Even the unofficial dean of the Chicago School, 
Judge Richard Posner, has admitted the connection between neoclassical law 
and economics and present economic crisis.  See RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE 
OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION xii, 270 
(2009) (“We are learning from [the crisis] that we need a more active and 
intelligent government to keep our model of a capitalist economy from running 
off the rails. . . . [T]he market can be blamed for recessions, which without 
government intervention would often turn into depressions, as they often did 
before the government learned (we thought!) in the after-math of the Great 
Depression how to prevent that from happening.”).  Alan Greenspan, previously 
a staunch advocate of non-regulation of the financial markets, has recently 
recanted his faith in the self-correcting power of free markets.  Alan Greenspan, 
as quoted in EDMUND L. ANDREWS, BUSTED: LIFE INSIDE THE GREAT 
MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 65 (2009).  See also Alan Greenspan, The Crisis, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2010, at 3, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2010_spring_ 
bpea_papers/2010a_bpea_greenspan.pdf).  Critics have noted that the Chicago 
School has worked its effects not only on the United States economy, but 
globally.  See Paul H. Brietzke, Law and Economics Meets the Great Recession 
(2012), copy on file with the author. 
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detractors, but modern history confirms that law and economics is 
persuasive beyond the confirmed members of the discipline: critics 
and supporters alike agreed that at its height law and economics 
had established itself as the dominant and most influential 
contemporary mode of analysis among American legal scholars.3  
My thesis is that if the modes of persuasion of law and economics 
are to be used more generally in legal discourse outside the realm 
of economic analysis of law, the lessons of the Great Recession 
should serve as a caution toward the ethical and responsible use of 
these topics and tropes. 
My goal here is to critically examine the potential of the law 
and economics’ topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of 
style as contemporary legal rhetorical devices in areas of law not 
currently served by the economic analysis of law. 4  My goal is not 
                                                 
3
 Law and economics’ critics and proponents alike agree that at its height the 
movement had become the most dominant method of legal analysis among legal 
scholars in at least the last fifty years.  See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, 
The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, 
Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 142–43 (2003) 
[hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation], which states:  
The law and economics movement is quite strongly entrenched in the 
law schools, and is more powerful there than any of the other social 
sciences. . . . [T]he flourishing of law and economics [is] undeniable, 
. . . Economic analysis of law . . . has transformed American legal 
thought, . . . [and] enjoyed unparalleled success in the legal academy 
and in the judiciary . . . [making it] the most important development in 
legal scholarship of the twentieth century. 
Id. (inner citations omitted).  See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW xix (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW] ("[Law and economics is] the foremost interdisciplinary field of legal 
studies”); Kenji Yoshino, The City and the Poet, 114 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 & 
n.6 (2005) (law and economics surpasses other movements in legal analysis, 
including law and literature). 
4
 This article continues the conversation I have begun with my work, Law 
and Economics as a Rhetorical Perspective in Law, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1830573 (May 3, 2011).  I currently plan to release this 
work in two parts, the current article here and an article entitled, The Great 
Recession and the Rhetorical Canons of Law and Economics.  My project 
pursues a new topic in the general conversation begun by other scholars who 
have examined the rhetoric of law and economics.  E.g., Donald N. McCloskey, 
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to critique the neoclassical or contemporary law and economics5 
analysis of law nor to examine the benefits or costs of the 
application of economic analysis in shaping law and social policy.6  
I seek to examine the potential uses and misuses of the rhetorical 
devices of law and economics in general legal discourse because 
the misuse of these devices played a role in bringing about the 
Great Recession.   
A central focus of the discipline of law and economics is the 
study of human nature and human behavior7 in order to predict 
what incentives can be communicated to humans that will motivate 
them to act or react, and thus law and economics shares a common 
goal of rhetoric, the study of communication and persuasion.  The 
                                                                                                             
The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1988) [hereinafter 
McCloskey, Rhetoric of Law and Economics]. 
5
 I use the term “contemporary law and economics” to mean twenty-first 
century law and economics that incorporates behavioral and socio-economic 
approaches to the study and analysis of law.  This shall be distinguished from 
“new” or “neoclassical” law and economics that developed in the 1960s and 
which applied neoclassical economic principles and methodologies to the 
analysis of law.  New or neoclassical law and economics is also referred to as 
“traditional” or “conventional” law and economics.  See generally POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, at 31; Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and 
the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2088 (1996); Jon Hanson 
& David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on 
the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 77, 83, 138 (2004) [hereinafter Hanson & 
Yosifon, The Situational Character]; Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The 
Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 71, 73; Joshua D. Wright, Behavioral Law and Economics, Paternalism, 
and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 470, 
470–72 (2007). 
6
 Not to mention the Pareto superiority or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency obtained 
through contemporary economic analysis of law. See ROBERT COOTER & 
THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 18 (5th ed. 2008). 
7
 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach 
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1998) (“law and 
economics analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about 
actual human behavior”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and 
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) [hereinafter Korobkin & Ulen, 
Law and Behavioral Science] ("Law and economics is, at root, a behavioral 
theory, and therein lies its true power."). 
6  [FEBRUARY 2012] 
advocates of the economic analysis of law must persuade their own 
cohorts of the truth of their discoveries, and use the rhetoric of 
their discipline to do so, and also seek to communicate the lessons 
of their economic analysis of law to the wider legal community, 
and again use the rhetoric of their discipline to persuade the wider 
audience.   
The recognition that the rhetoric of law and economics is 
persuasive—and not just to legal economists—reveals the 
enormous potential of law and economics as a lens on legal 
discourse through which to examine the structure and design of the 
discourse and as a source of topoi (topics) of invention and 
arrangement and tropes of style in the content of the discourse.  
The topoi and tropes of law and economics inspire inventive 
thinking about the law that constructs meaning for the author and 
the audience.  For many members of the legal writing discourse 
community—judges, practitioners, government agencies, and 
academics—the modes of persuasion of law and economics can 
provide a critical perspective to construct meaning and improve the 
persuasiveness of legal discourse generally in content, 
arrangement, and style.  As such, law and economics rhetoric can 
join the other schools of contemporary rhetoric8—modern 
argument theory,9 writing as a process theory,10 and discourse 
                                                 
8
 Basic sources on contemporary rhetoric include: PATRICIA BIZZEL & BRUCE 
HERZBERG, THE RHETORICAL TRADITION (Patricia Bizzel & Bruce Herzberg 
eds., 1990); PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE (1987); Carroll C. Arnold, 
Rhetoric in America since 1900, in RE-ESTABLISHING THE SPEECH PROFESSION: 
THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS (Robert T. Oliver & Marvin G. Bauer eds., 1959); John 
B. Bender & David E. Wellbery, Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of 
Rhetoric, in THE ENDS OF RHETORIC: HISTORY, THEORY, PRACTICE (John B. 
Bender & David E. Wellbery eds., 1990); James L. Kinneavy, Contemporary 
Rhetoric, in THE PRESENT STATE OF SCHOLARSHIP IN HISTORICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC (Winifred B. Horner ed., rev. ed. 1990);.  See also 
sources cited in notes 7–9, infra. 
9
 See, e.g., JEROME BRUNER & ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, MINDING THE LAW, 
chs. 2–3, 6–7 (2002); CHAIM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE 
NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell 
Weaver trans., 1969); STEPHEN TOULMIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO 
REASONING (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter TOULMIN, INTRODUCTION TO 
REASONING]; FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
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community theory11—as a lens through which to examine and 
improve the persuasiveness of legal discourse. 
Law and economics is a discipline that brings a unique 
combination of modes of persuasion used both as rhetorical topoi12 
                                                                                                             
ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND 
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS (1996); Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, 
Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court 
Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949 (2007) 
(the corporate metaphor in modern argument theory); Linda L. Berger, What is 
the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor 
Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 169 
(2004) (use of metaphor in modern argument theory and cognitive studies); 
Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An Annotated 
Bibliography, 3 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 129, 139 (2006) 
[hereinafter Smith, Rhetoric Theory]; Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion: An 
Annotated Bibliography, 6 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 75, 80–81 
(2009) [hereinafter Stanchi, Persuasion]. 
10
 See Linda L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing 
Teacher as Reader and Writer, 6 LEGAL WRITING 57 (2000) [hereinafter Berger, 
Reflective Rhetorical Model]; Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal 
Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1999); Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the 
Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163 (1993); 
Leigh Hunt Greenhaw, “To Say What the Law Is”: Learning the Practice of 
Legal Rhetoric, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 861 (1995); Carol McCrehan Parker, 
Writing Throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need It and How to 
Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REV. 561 (1997); Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal 
Rhetoric, 40 SW. L.J. 1089 (1986); Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 139. 
11
 See Brook K. Baker, Language Acculturation Process and the Resistance to 
In “doctrine” ation in the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary 
on Mertz's Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 131 (2000); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, 
Writing, and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002); 
Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking 
About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887 (2002); J. Christopher Rideout & 
Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35 (1994); 
Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 139; Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance is 
Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's Marginalization 
of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7 (1998); Joseph M. Williams, On the 
Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and Development, 1 LEGAL 
WRITING 1 (1991). 
12
 In rhetoric, the topoi [Greek] or loci [Latin] (singular, topos or locus = 
“place”) are the “topics” or “subjects” of argument that can be made in various 
8  [FEBRUARY 2012] 
and tropes13 to construct meaning and to inform and persuade its 
audiences:   
o Mathematical and scientific methods of analysis and 
demonstration; 
o The characterization of legal phenomena as incentives 
and costs,  
o The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency; and  
o Rational choice theory as corrected by the modern 
behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain 
science. 
                                                                                                             
situations.  Topoi are developed in the process of inventio [Latin] or heuresis 
[Greek], which may be translated as “invention” or “discovery” of the type of 
argument that will be most persuasive in the situation, and in the dispositio 
[Latin] or taxis [Greek] of the argument, which translates as the “arrangement” 
or “organization” or “disposition” of the contents of the argument.  See EDWARD 
P.J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN 
STUDENT 17, 20, 89–91 (4th ed. 1999); Gabriele Knappe, Classical Rhetoric in 
Anglo-Saxon England, 27 ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 5, 25 (Cambridge 1998). 
13
 Tropes are developed in the rhetorical process of style (Latin elocutio; 
Greek lexis), which pertains to the composition and wording of the discourse, 
including grammar, word choice, and figures of speech. See generally CORBETT 
AND CONNORS, supra note 10, at 20, 378; Knappe, supra note 10, at 25–26; 
Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 129, 133–34 & n.2 (collecting sources 
on style in classical rhetoric).  Figures of speech were divided into tropes 
(creative variations on the meanings of words) and schemes (artful deviations 
from the ordinary arrangements of words).  Linda L. Berger, Studying and 
Teaching “Law as Rhetoric”:  A Place to Stand, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 
51 & n.179 (2010) [hereinafter Berger, Law as Rhetoric].  Professors Berger, 
Corbett, and Connors identify the classically identified tropes as metaphor, 
simile, synecdoche, and metonymy; puns; antanaclasis (or repetition of a word 
in two different senses); paronomasia (use of words that sound alike but have 
different meanings); periphrasis (substitution of a descriptive word for a proper 
name or of a proper name for a quality associated with the name); 
personification; hyperbole; litotes (deliberate use of understatement); rhetorical 
question; irony; onomatopoeia; oxymoron; and paradox.  CORBETT AND 
CONNORS, supra, note 10, at 395–409; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra, at 51 & 
n.179.  See also MICHAEL R. SMITH, ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING 199–248 
(metaphors), 328–40 (other tropes) (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter SMITH, 
ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING]. 
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The rhetorical canons of law and economics have prescriptive 
implications for legal discourse as topoi of invention and 
arrangement and tropes of style.  Many of the topoi and tropes of 
law and economics operate on a different level of discourse than 
direct communication of economic information to expert members 
of the economic discourse community, therefore my discussion 
here will examine the concept of rhetorical levels of discourse.  I 
will then examine each of the canons of law and economics as a 
source of rhetorical topoi and tropes for general legal discourse. 
I. LEVELS OF DISCOURSE IN CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC 
Rhetoric, in the most complete sense, is the study of effective 
communication.14  Effectiveness in communication is determined 
by the audience and the situation.15  There can be multiple 
audiences that receive a communication, some are direct targets 
within the conception and understanding of the author in preparing 
the discourse, and others are indirect receivers of the discourse.  
The level of communication, and thus the level of rhetoric, applied 
to the different audiences is not the same—not every audience will 
receive, decode, and draw meaning from the communication at the 
same level of understanding. 
Building on the work of Wayne C. Booth, the late professor 
and a leading rhetorician from the University of Chicago (but not 
of the “Chicago School” of economics), I will explain the three 
levels of rhetorical persuasion: 
Level 1 Rhetoric— Understanding of the Members of 
Discipline 
Level 1 rhetoric (rhetoric-1) is true understanding and 
acceptance of the truth of the discourse by members of the 
discipline in which the discourse occurs, who are schooled and 
                                                 
14
 Gadamer, supra note 13, at 348; Mootz, supra note xx, at 317; White, Law 
as Rhetoric, supra note xx, at 695. 
15
 MAKAY, supra note xx, at 9; ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL 
WRITERS, supra note xx, at 9; Wetlaufer, supra note xx, at 1546. 
10  [FEBRUARY 2012] 
knowledgeable in the disciple and its theories.  This level of 
understanding is reserved to experts in the field.16 
Level 2 Rhetoric— Acceptance of the Persuasiveness of the 
Discourse by Understanding the Reliability 
of the Support 
Level 2 rhetoric (rhetoric-2) is not a complete understanding of 
the discourse such as the understanding of members of the 
discipline of the discourse; the audiences for rhetoric-2 are 
receivers or decision-makers who do not completely understand 
the doctrine and theories of the discipline of the discourse.  
However, level 2 reception of the discourse allows for the audience 
to accept the indicia of truth and reliability of the discourse based 
on an understanding of the reliability of the sources supporting the 
discourse that are used in the discourse17—scientific results, 
scholarly sources, accepted forms of evidence, works with known 
reputations—or the reliability of sources external to the discourse 
that support the discourse—the character and testimony of trusted 
recommenders and the observation of peer-acceptance of the work 
and the author by members of the same discipline who presumably 
have rhetoric-1 understanding of the material in the discourse.18  
The acceptance of the reliability of the supporting sources allows 
                                                 
16
 See Booth, Idea of University, supra note xx, at 12. 
17
 See WAYNE C. BOOTH, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSENT 
xiii, 112 & n.19 (1974).  See also M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl, 
Putting Expert Testimony in its Epistemological Place: What Predictions of 
Dangerousness in Court Can Teach Us, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1128 & n.44, 
1156 & n.170, 1161–62 (2008) (quoting Eileen A. Scallen & William E. 
Wiethoff, The Ethos of Expert Witnesses: Confusing the Admissibility, 
Sufficiency and Credibility of Expert Testimony, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1143–
44 (1998) (“[T]he testimonial discourse of experts, though not cast in the elegant 
form of oratory, has rhetorical tenor and effect.  Expert testimony, even that 
based on natural or social science, is argumentation, made for, and in, a unique 
context—the law ....”)). 
18
 Booth, Idea of University, supra note xx, at 12–13. 
          Law and Economics’ Invention, Arrangement, and Style 11 
for persuasion of the truth and reliability of the discourse even 
without fully understanding the discourse.19   
Level 3 Rhetoric— Persuasion by the Internal Consistency and 
Methodology of the Discourse 
The third level of rhetoric (rhetoric-3) again is one in which the 
audience of decision-makers does not completely understand the 
truth of the discipline and its theories, but the audience observes 
the internal consistency and logic and how the discourse tracks 
under the evaluation of the design and execution of the 
discourse20—an evaluation that asks questions such as:  Do the 
methods used appear to be sound, does the author appear to be 
competent in employing them, and is the end product logical and 
internally consistent?21 An example would be the evaluation of a 
scholarly journal article to determine if the author appears to be 
competent and the writing consistent with the standards for 
scholarly inquiry and discourse within the academy or within one 
institution, such as a university, as a whole.22  Another rhetorical 
way of understanding this level of rhetoric is whether the author 
displays the proper ethos of her role in the creation of the 
discourse.23 
                                                 
19
 Id.  Professor Ellen P. Goodman, in Stealth Marketing and Editorial 
Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 115 (2006), describes the communication theory 
of Jürgen Habermas that depends upon the existence of communicative action in 
discourse to “reach understanding” or “communicatively achieved agreement.” 
1 Jürgen Habermas, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 42, 286–87, 305 
(orig. ed. 1981; Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984). Communicative action 
persuades by using a set of “validity claims.” Id. at 75, 308. News reporting of 
world events may make a “constative” utterance whose claim to validity is truth.  
Id. at 309, 323. Storytelling and narrative reasoning may be considered 
“expressive” utterances whose claim to validity is rooted in nothing more than 
sincerity.  Id. at 174, 325–26. “Regulative” utterances have a claim to validity of 
“rightness.” Id.  Participants to communicative action can either accept these 
validity claims or subject them to criticism and demand justification.  Id. at 99. 
20
 Booth, Idea of University, supra note xx, at 13–14. 
21
 See id. 
22
 Id. 
23
 Ethos embodies both moral and intellectual qualities.  JAKOB WISSE, ETHOS 
AND PATHOS FROM ARISTOTLE TO CICERO 30 (1989).  While virtue and high 
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In making recommendations for legal discourse based on the 
rhetoric of law and economics, I will mention the level of rhetoric 
of the device employed.  In many instances, it will not be rhetoric-
1 discourse, that which an economist would aim to achieve when 
communicating with other economists, and law and economics 
scholars would aim to achieve when communicating with other 
law and economics scholars.  In most cases, the rhetorical devices 
described here will be modes of persuasion at the rhetoric-2 and 
                                                                                                             
moral character obviously are concepts relating to the advocate’s ethics and 
morality, the concept of practical wisdom suggests that the audience must 
perceive the advocate’s reasoning as sound, not simply from a formal logical 
standpoint but in a broader sense of perceiving that the advocate possesses 
credibility and common sense.  ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, at 
Book II, ch. 1 at 1378a; WISSE, supra, at 30.  The concept of good will indicates 
that the advocate should evince good will and benevolence toward the audience 
as opposed to a spirit of malice revealed through attempted deception, 
obfuscation, or self-aggrandizement.  ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, 
at Book II, ch. 1 at 1378a; CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 72–73; 
WISSE, supra, at 30–33.  Classical rhetoric focused as much on projecting the 
right moral character as in possessing it.  CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, 
at 72; WISSE, supra, at 31; Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 
DICK. L. REV. 85, 100–01 (1994) [hereinafter Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal 
Audience].  “[A] person seeming to have all these qualities is necessarily 
persuasive to the hearers.”  ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 16, at Book 
II, ch. 1 at 1378a (emphasis added).  Good moral character can be projected 
through the discourse itself; it is not necessary that the advocate possess a 
widely-known reputation for uprightness and good moral character when 
entering into the proceedings or that the advocate self-consciously point out 
aspects and examples of his own good character in the discourse (although those 
means are recognized as being available to the advocate in proper circumstances 
if handled with appropriate delicacy).  See CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, 
at 72–73; Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra, at 100–101.  The 
ethical appeal has particular importance in legal discourse because the modes of 
persuasion through enthymemes and examples present arguments based on 
probability not certainty of proof.  CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 72.  
Thus, it matters dearly when the audience weighs the persuasiveness of 
arguments and counter-arguments based on probability that the audience 
perceive the advocate as credible and believable, “possessing genuine wisdom 
and excellence of character.”  Id. (quoting 3 QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA, 
supra note 17, sec. viii at 13).  The slightest lapse in good sense, good will, or 
moral integrity might turn the audience away from acceptance of the arguments.  
Id. at 73. 
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rhetoric-3 levels of persuasion: persuasiveness based on the 
reliability of the support demonstrated in the rhetoric or 
persuasiveness based on the internal logic and methodology—in 
short, the ethos—of the discourse. 
II. THE RHETORICAL CANONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
A. The Nature of the Rhetoric of Law and Economics 
Contemporary law and economics is a discipline whose 
persuasion is built from the application of scientific analyses—
especially mathematics and the quantitative analysis of empirical 
data—to social problems.24  Law is a discipline that attempts to 
deal with social problems, and legal issues and the social 
conditions created or imposed or perpetuated by the state of the 
law are problems or conditions that may be subjected to economic 
analyses “with coherent theory, precise hypotheses deduced from 
the theory, and empirical tests of the hypotheses.”25 
Economics provides scientific theories to predict the effects of 
legal rules on behavior that surpasses mere intuition, logic, or 
common sense concerning human behavior.26  The theories are 
behavioral theories that seek to predict how people will respond to 
laws when laws are viewed as a system of incentives.27  Legal 
economists assert that economics is a persuasive rhetorical lens on 
                                                 
24
 Heilbroner states: 
Economics prides itself on its sciencelike character, and economists on 
their ability to speak like scientists, without color, passion, or values, 
preferably in the language of mathematics. . . . [M]ost [economics] 
articles are “written” in matrix algebra, complex econometrics, formal 
lemmas, and four-quadrant diagrammatics.  They would be 
incomprehensible to anyone not trained in the vocabulary and 
techniques of advanced economics . . . [T]he language of formalism 
and mathematics is still a language, and therefore inescapably 
“rhetorical.” 
Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Idealogy, supra note xx, at 38–39.  See also Herbert 
M. Kritzer, The Arts of Persuasion in Science and Law:  Conflicting Norms in 
the Courtroom, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 42–43, 59 (2009). 
25
 Posner, Foreword, supra note xx, at 5. 
26
 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 3, 4. 
27
 See id. at 4. 
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the law because it has mathematically precise theories (price 
theory and game theory) and empirically sound methods (statistics 
and econometrics) of analyzing the effects of legal rules and 
sanctions (viewed as incentives, prices, or costs) on (presumptively 
rational) human behavior to achieve desirable (efficient) results for 
individuals and for society.28 
B. The Four Canons of Law and Economics 
Economics combines mathematically precise theories and 
empirically sound methods of analyzing the effects of incentives 
and costs on presumptively rational human behavior to achieve 
efficient results for individuals and for society.29  From this, I 
derive the four canons of law and economics rhetoric: 
Mathematics and Science 
The primacy of mathematical and scientific methods of 
analysis and demonstration 
Incentives and Costs 
The characterization of law and the legal system in the 
language of incentives and costs 
Efficiency 
The rhetorical economic concept of efficiency 
                                                 
28
 See id. at 3, 4, 5.  See also JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 2 
(4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS]; Kritzer, supra 
note xx, at 42–43, 59. 
29
 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 3, 4, 5.  The rhetorician James Boyd 
White channeled the rhetoric of law and economics when he characterized the 
legal system in the following way:  “The overriding metaphor is that of the 
machine; the overriding value is that of efficiency, conceived of as the 
attainment of certain ends with the smallest possible costs.” James Boyd White, 
Rhetoric and Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, in THE RHETORIC 
OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES: LANGUAGE AND ARGUMENT IN SCHOLARSHIP AND 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 298, 300 (John S. Nelson et al. eds., 1987) (quoted in Levine & 
Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra note xx, at 114). 
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Contemporary Theory 
The contemporary rational choice theory as corrected by 
modern behavioral social sciences, cognitive studies, and brain 
Each of four canons of law and economics are used both as 
topics of invention and arrangement and tropes of 
persuasive discourse.  The canons represent the fundamental 
assumptions upon and from which propositions regarding law and 
economics will be measured as persuasive in both conception and 
design and according to which theses concerning law and 
economics will be accepted as reliable and authoritative by the 
members of the law and economics discipline
by the members of the law and economics discourse community.
Therefore, these canons are described as 
and economics. 
                                        
30
 The sources I have consulted to derive these four canons are many and 
varied, but for general reference, 
41–43; POSNER, ECONOMIC 
24–25, 495–96; Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, 
Behavioral Economics
31
 “Discourse community
rhetoric of law and economics.  
Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory
(economic representing a change in discourse); Gary Minda, 
Movements of the 1980s
the discourse of law and economics).
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of Rational Choice 
science 
style in 
30
—in other words, 
rhetorical canons of law 
 
         
see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 2, 3, 4, 5, 
ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 3–4, 9, 13, 21, 
Law and Economics after 
, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 629 (2007). 
” is a term that grounds this discussion as to the 
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding 
, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 419–38 (1995) 
The Jurisprudential 
, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 611 & n.53 (1989) (describing 
 
Efficiency
Incentives 
and Costs
Math and 
Science
Rational 
Choice
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Author
•Ethos
C. The Interaction of the Rhetorical Canons of Law and 
Economics 
Canons of rhetoric are customarily expressed or depicted in a 
manner that reflects the interaction of the canons in a persuasive 
exercise; all of the canons work together and simul
affect the persuasiveness of the discourse of the discipline or 
activity.  Each canon also simultaneously affects the operation of 
the other canons, making them more or less persuasive.  In 
classical rhetoric, the three canons of invention (as
persuasion that must be devised or “invented” by the author or 
speaker) known as 
a rhetorical triangle to suggest the interaction of the factors one to 
another and the combined impact on the recipient of the discourse:
 
 
 
 
With regard to the classical modes of invention, Jakob Wisse 
presents the concept as a l
                                        
32
 See CORBETT & 
RHETORIC, supra note xx
17, 52; Frost, Lost Heritage
Roman Legal Analysis: The Topics of Invention
(1992) [hereinafter 
Aristotle's Logic, in T
ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
sum2002/entries/aristotle
Oct. 5, 2000). 
33
 WISSE, supra note xx
 [FEBRUARY 201
LOGOS
PATHOS ETHOS
Message
•Logos
Audience
•Pathos
taneously to 
pects of 
logos, ethos, and pathos,32 are often depicted as 
inear flow-chart:33 
         
CONNORS, supra note 10, at 71–84; KENNEDY, CLASSICAL 
, at 68, 75, 82, 89; Covino & Joliffe, supra note 15, at 
, supra note 17, at 617–18; Michael Frost, Greco
, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 107, 127 
Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis]; Robin Smith, 
HE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Fall 2004 
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
-logic/ (last accessed Jan. 2, 2011) (last substantive edit 
, at 8. 
2] 
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James Kinneavy identifies these terms as Encoder – Signal – 
Decoder, linking the author, the language or message, and the 
reader or audience to reality.34  The author projects his ethos along 
with or, in optimal circumstance, as part of the logos of the 
message so as to influence the pathos of the audience.35  
The rhetorical pathways are fundamentally pragmatic.36  
Aristotle sought to remind advocates that an argument is not one-
dimensional.  The most logically constructed argument still will 
not persuade an audience if the audience questions the knowledge, 
skill, or credibility of the author.  Similarly, the most respected 
author whose reputation is beyond question still will not win the 
day if her argument is riddled with logical fallacies and comes 
apart at the seams with a single, gentle tug at one of its logical 
flaws.  An ironclad argument may be delivered in such a way as to 
antagonize the audience, or the effect of the argument may be 
squandered if the audience begins to question the integrity and 
credibility of the author.37 
The four canons of law and economics rhetoric interact 
together at the same time and toward the same audience.  Proper 
economic discourse incorporates each canon for the persuasion of 
the audience.  There is a connection and interaction in the 
discourse of each canon to the others that influences the persuasion 
of the audience—one cannot alter or abandon the canons of 
efficiency, mathematical and scientific certainty, response to 
incentives, and even rational choice without affecting the 
persuasiveness and effectiveness of the economic discourse.  An 
incorrect, overstated, or deceptive message regarding one canon 
                                                 
34
 See JAMES L. KINNEAVY, A THEORY OF DISCOURSE: THE AIMS OF 
DISCOURSE 19 (1971) [hereinafter KINNEAVY, THEORY OF DISCOURSE]; Linda 
L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The Legal Writing Teacher as Reader 
and Writer, 6 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 57, 67 (2000); Phelps, supra note 8, at 
1091. 
35
 WISSE, supra note xx, at 7–8. 
36
 See Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 17, at 614, 624, 625, 627; Eileen A. 
Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 
AM. U. L. REV. 1717, 1728–29 (1995). 
37
 See generally CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 72–73; Frost, Ethos, 
Pathos & Legal Audience, supra note xx. 
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puts the others at risk of suspicion or rejection by the audience. 
with classical rhetorical modes of
canons of law and economics may be depicted visually, although 
with four canons it shall be a rhetorical diamond, not a triangle:
In modern argument theory, the author of the discourse 
(Speaker) codes the discourse (
(Audience) according to the conditions, requirements, and 
limitations of the context of the discourse (
economics rhetorical discourse, the 
closely aligned with the canon of
achieve an efficient purpose is coded in the language of 
and Costs and is framed for the needs of the Audience according to 
the Rational Choice Theory
reference to the rhetorical 
the methods of Mathematics and Science.  Therefore, I will realign 
the rhetorical diamond of the canons of law and economics 
depicting the flow of the discourse wherein each canon feeds into 
and simultaneously dr
the components of modern argument theory
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The diagram indicates the rhetorical modes I discuss in 
A.  Mathematics and Science 
Arrangement and as a Trope of Style. 
B. Incentives and Costs 
Arrangement and as a Trope of Style.
C.  Efficiency 
and as a Trope of Style.
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III. THE CANONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS AS RHETORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES IN LAW 
A. Rhetoric-1-2-3 Uses of Mathematics and Science as Topics of 
Invention and Arrangement and a Trope of Style 
Rhetoric under the modern argument theory of contemporary 
rhetorical theory is crafting discourse for the audience and the 
situation.38  Modern argument theory confronts the problem of the 
indeterminacy of language.39  The linguistic limitations of 
indeterminacy mean that arguments are not provable in the 
absolute unless the language used, such as the language of 
mathematics and formal logic, is determinate enough for absolute 
proof, at least “proof” within the language of that discipline.40  
Outside the realms of mathematics and formal logic, language is 
only determinative of probabilities of meaning, so that when the 
discourse extends beyond pure mathematics and formal logic, 
argumentation depends on the construction of the most reasonable 
and probable argument that can be made in the social situation or 
institutional setting.41  The argument is not offered as 
incontrovertible proof, but instead as the most reasonable and 
probable outcome that can be advocated in the situation.42 
                                                 
38
 See generally BURKE, RHETORIC OF MOTIVES, supra note 18; PERELMAN & 
L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 7; TOULMIN, USES OF ARGUMENT, supra 
note 18; Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra note 18, at 6–8, 389–92; 
Greenhaw, supra note 8, at 875–80. 
39
 See BRUNER & AMSTERDAM, supra note 7, at chs. 2–3, 6–7; PERELMAN & 
OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 7; TOULMIN, INTRODUCTION TO REASONING, 
supra note 7; FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN ET AL., supra note 7; Smith, Rhetoric 
Theory, supra note 7, at 139. 
40
 See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 7; TOULMIN, 
INTRODUCTION TO REASONING, supra note 7; Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra 
note 7, at 139. 
41
 See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 7; TOULMIN, 
INTRODUCTION TO REASONING, supra note 7; Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra 
note 7, at 139. 
42
 See generally PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 7; 
TOULMIN, USES OF ARGUMENT, supra note 18.  In the legal arena, this theory 
accepts the fact that the advocate has a client whose facts and legal situation are 
not necessarily the best possible circumstances for a person legally to be 
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Invention and arrangement are the canons that directly confront 
the rhetorical problem of composing the language for a meaning 
and persuasion by the audience in the situation: 
Invention:  Invention is the canon that describes the means to 
create, devise, and conceive of persuasive discourse.43 The term 
invention is a translation of the Latin inventio and carries the same 
meaning as the Greek term for invention or discovery, heuristic 
(Ευρετική).44 The canon is divided into two parts, the modes of 
argument and persuasion that are invented or created by the 
author—the entechnic pisteis or “artistic” or “artificial” proofs 
known as logos, pathos, and ethos45—and the modes of argument 
and persuasion that the author does not or cannot invent, but that 
are discovered or found—the atechnic pisteis or “non-artistic” or 
“non-artificial” proofs, including facts and data, statistics and 
reports, documents and contracts, sworn testimony (including 
expert testimony), interviews, polls, and surveys.46   
The canon of invention serves as a reminder to authors of legal 
discourse to consider the available means of persuasion and the 
interaction of the modes chosen so as not to leave out available 
means or employ self-contradictory or self-defeating means.  The 
classical rhetoricians did not consider this canon to be a list of 
                                                                                                             
involved in; nevertheless, the advocate must offer the most reasonable, probable, 
and compelling argument in support of his or her client's position that can be 
raised in the situation, with the hope that the decision-maker will find the 
argument more reasonable and compelling than the opponent's arguments.  
Smith, Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 139 (citing Kurt M. Saunders, Law as 
Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 566, 567 (1994)). 
43
 Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 17, at 617; Michael Frost, Greco-Roman 
Legal Analysis, supra note xx, at 110. 
44
 See Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 12, at 48; http://howtosay.org/ 
en_el/Heuristic (last accessed Jan. 2, 2011).  “Heureka,” a/k/a “eureka,” is “I 
have found (it),” the first person, singular, perfect active indicative form of 
heuriskein, the Greek verb “to find.” See http://wordinfo.info/unit/781?letter= 
E&spage=6 (last accessed Jan. 2, 2011). 
45
 See, e.g., Michael R. Smith, Introduction to Logos, Pathos, and Ethos, in 
ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING, supra note 11, at 10–25. 
46
 See THOMAS CONLEY, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 (1990); 
Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra note 18, at 118–21; Simpson 
& Selden, supra note xx, at 1011. 
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required elements of argument.47  Ideally, using the classical 
rhetorical canon of invention, the discourse should be crafted to 
persuade through logos,48 a logical exposition of the argument, as 
well as by revealing the competence and integrity of the author to 
handle the exposition itself (ethos),49 and inspire emotions that put 
the audience in a frame of mind to be persuaded by the argument 
(pathos),50 by using the non-artificial facts and evidence made 
available by the rhetorical situation. 
Classical rhetoric follows three paths simultaneously toward 
the goal of persuasion: ethos (persuasion accomplished through the 
perceived character or reputation of the speaker),51 pathos 
(persuasion accomplished through the emotional response of the 
audience to the communication),52 and logos (persuasion 
accomplished through logical reasoning embodied in the content of 
the communication).53  The interaction of the three means of 
persuasion may be depicted as a “rhetorical triangle” similar to the 
“communication triangle” discussed in contemporary rhetorical 
theory54 (see diagram below): 
  
                                                 
47
 See Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 17, at 617–18; Frost, Greco-Roman 
Legal Analysis, supra note xx, at 127. 
48
 See Smith, supra note 133. 
49
 CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 71–77; KENNEDY, CLASSICAL 
RHETORIC, supra note 52, at 68, 75; Covino & Joliffe, supra note 15, at 52. 
50
 CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 11, at 77–84; KENNEDY, CLASSICAL 
RHETORIC, supra note xx, at 82, 89; Covino & Joliffe supra note 15, at 17. 
51
 ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Univ. of Iowa Rhetoric Dep’t, The Rhetorical Triangle: Logos, Ethos and 
Pathos, MORPHING TEXTBOOK~RHETORIC TOOLS at http://www.uiowa.edu/ 
~rhetoric/morphing_textbook/general/triangle.html (last accessed Dec. 27, 
2010); see also KINNEAVY, THEORY OF DISCOURSE, supra note xx, at 19; Levine 
& Saunders, supra note 18, at 114–15; Phelps, supra note 8, at 1091–93. 
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In this conceptualization, the three paths of persuasion flow 
into one another:  the logos of the argument affects the pathos in 
the audience and simultaneously affects the perception of the ethos 
of the author; the pathos of the audience
perceive the ethos of the author and how they receive the logos of 
the argument. 
Arrangement
(Latin dispositio; Greek 
the discourse for 
purpose driven—
discourse depends on the speaker, the speaker’s purpose, the 
setting or situation, the characteristics of the speaker’s audience, 
and the audience’s pur
point, the classical rhetoricians developed a complex paradigm for 
arguments that still is applied in court rules
briefs: Exordium
presented), Narratio
                                        
55
 See CORBETT & 
Rhetoric, supra note 
Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis
56
 See CORBETT &
FROST, INTRODUCTION TO 
[hereinafter FROST, C
supra note 11, at 50. 
57
 E.g., U.S. Supreme Ct. Rules 14, 24; 
RHETORIC, supra note xx
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 members affects how they 
:  The classical rhetorical canon of arrangement 
taxis) pertains to the order and design of 
persuasive effect.55  Arrangement is context and 
the proper and persuasive arrangement of 
pose, desire, or motivation.56  As a starting 
57
 for trial and appellate 
 (introduction or statement of the issues 
 (statement of the case), Partitio (summary of 
         
CONNORS, supra note 10, at 20, 256–92; Berger, Law as 
11, at 50; Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 17, at 617–19; 
, supra note xx, at 182–89. 
 CONNORS, supra note 10, at 20, 256–92; MICHAEL 
CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC 4, 34, 35 (2005) 
LASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC]; Berger, Law as Rhetoric
see FROST, CLASSICAL LEGAL 
, at 45; Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 11, at 50.
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the argument), Confirmatio (argument), and Peroratio 
(conclusion).58 
As with the other canons of rhetoric, arrangement was 
considered to be of high importance to the persuasiveness of the 
discourse.  Sloppy, disorderly, or impenetrable arrangements 
defeat access to the demonstration of the workings of the 
argument, deny falsifiability, distract the audience’s attention from 
the communication of the discourse, and deflate the audience’s 
reception and reaction to the argument.  All of this prevents 
persuasion. 
1. The Entechnic Pisteis (Artistic) Modes of Logos in 
Mathematical and Scientific Methods of Invention and 
Arrangement 
Mathematics and science already tread the logos pathway to 
persuasive discourse through the logical deductive structure of the 
syllogism59 and the logical inductive structure of the induction.60  
                                                 
58
 See FROST, CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC, supra note xx, at 45.  The 
dispositio of the argument also may contain refutatio, the making and meeting 
of counter-arguments.  In De Inventione, Cicero named six parts: exordium, 
narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio (refutation, counter-argumentation), 
and conclusio (conclusion).  CICERO, DE INVENTIONE, supra note 17, at 1.19.  
The Rhetorica ad Herennium names six parts of dispositio: exordium, narratio, 
divisio (summary, breakdown of arguments), confirmatio, confutatio (counter-
argumentation), and conclusio.  RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM § 1.3 (H. Caplan 
trans., Harv. U. Press 1954).  See Russ VerSteeg & Nina Barclay, Rhetoric and 
Law in Ovid's Orpheus, 15 L. & LITERATURE 395, 409–10 & n.71, 413 (2003). 
59
 Deductive reasoning is the process of formation of a major premise or 
general proposition and moving to the analysis of a minor premise or specific 
proposition so as to draw a conclusion.  John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach 
to Mediation–Part I: Classical Rhetoric and the Art of Persuasion in Mediation, 
19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 83, 88–89 (1993); Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis, 
supra note xx, at 118; Robbins, Paradigm Lost, supra note xx, at 492–93.  
Aristotle characterized all forms of deductive reasoning as belonging to the topic 
of syllogisms. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 1 at 
1356.  In a legal argument, a legal rule—a statement of the legal principles that 
govern a general set of circumstances—is applied to a new situation—a specific 
set of facts—to produce a conclusion about the outcome of this application.  
MURRAY & DESANCTIS, supra note xx, at 8–9. 
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The same forms may be used in invention and arrangement in 
rhetoric to construct meaning and respond to the expectations of 
the legal writing discourse community.61 
The syllogism and enthymeme (deductive forms)62 and the 
induction and example (inductive forms)63 are topoi of 
                                                                                                             
60
 The process of induction finds a general proposition to be true because of its 
relationship to a number of other specific propositions that are known to be true.  
A certain genus of situations with identifiable characteristics can be defined 
from a synthesis of known situations (“species” of situations, or “precedents”) 
that all share these characteristics.  See Rapp, supra note xx, at §§ 5(C), 7.4.  
Aristotle called a rhetorical induction an “example.”  ARISTOTLE, THE 
RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b; Scharffs, supra note 52, at 
752 & n.58; Schmidt, supra note xx, at 372–73. 
61
 The mathematical and scientific forms match the structure for legal 
discourse and rhetoric derived from the classical tradition, in which there are 
two permitted logical structures for an argument, the deductive and the 
inductive.  ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a; 
CICERO, DE INVENTIONE, supra note 17, at 93; QUINTILIAN, supra note 17, at 
273.  The forms for effective legal discourse, as opposed to mathematical, 
scientific proof, were the deductive, syllogistic rhetorical form known as an 
enthymeme, and the inductive rhetorical form known as an example or paradigm 
argument.  ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b.  
See also GEORGE A. KENNEDY, ARISTOTLE ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC 
DISCOURSE 40 & n.49 (1991) [hereinafter KENNEDY, ON RHETORIC].  Aristotle 
believed the enthymeme to be the superior of the two forms.  ARISTOTLE, THE 
RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a, Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b.    
62
 In the deductive structure, both syllogisms and enthymemes begin with a 
major premise and follow with a minor premise so as to produce a conclusion.  
The difference between the two forms is that in a true syllogism each major 
premise must be a true statement of absolute certainty, and the minor premise 
also must be a true statement of absolute certainty, so that the conclusion is 
absolutely, irrefutably true.  CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 38–48.  
This is referred to by Aristotle as a “complete proof.”  ARISTOTLE, THE 
RHETORIC, supra note 17, at Book I, ch. 2 at 1357.  In an enthymeme, the major 
premise, whether it be explicitly stated or implied in the enthymeme, must be 
most probably true. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 53 (quoting 
ARISTOTLE, THE LOGIC: PRIOR ANALYTICS, Book II, ch. 27); Frost, Lost 
Heritage, supra note 17, at 635–36; Michael Frost, Justice Scalia's Rhetoric of 
Dissent: a Greco-Roman Analysis of Scalia's Advocacy in the VMI Case, 91 KY. 
L.J. 167, 168 n.6 (2002) [hereinafter Frost, Scalia’s Rhetoric]; Steven D. Jamar, 
Aristotle Teaches Persuasion: The Psychic Connection, 8 SCRIBES J. LEGAL 
WRITING 61, 77, 80, 81–84 (2001–2002).  In other words, truth with absolute 
certainty is not required, only probability of truth.  CORBETT & CONNORS, supra 
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arrangement in science, mathematics, and rhetorical 
demonstration.64  By borrowing the structure of mathematics and 
science, legal discourse can engage in open demonstration of the 
reasoning process in a form that is recognized as authoritative and 
persuasive.65  The structure of the argument takes the form of 
logical, scientific deduction and induction to prove the 
proposition.66  Focusing on the rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-3 uses of 
                                                                                                             
note 10, at 53–54.  Similarly, the minor premise must be most probably true, not 
absolutely, necessarily true.  CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 10, at 53–54. 
Corbett and Connor’s definition of enthymeme in the Aristotelian sense is more 
appropriate for the evaluation of legal discourse than the more limited definition 
of an enthymeme as a truncated syllogism where one of the premises, usually 
the major premise, is implicit and unstated.  Accord EUGENE E. RYAN, 
ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF RHETORICAL ARGUMENTATION 29–34, 36, 38–41 
(1984); JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE STRUCTURE AND 
LANGUAGE OF EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 4–5, 8, 37–38 (1993).  As these authors 
point out, the implicit major premise is one potential aspect of an enthymeme 
that would differentiate it from a true syllogism, but it is not a requirement of 
every enthymeme.  This produces a conclusion that also is most probably true; 
but this is acceptable because the enthymeme’s purpose is to persuade, not to 
establish or define a proposition as a matter of scientific proof.  Id. at 53.  See 
Frost, Greco-Roman Legal Analysis, supra note xx, at 110. 
63
 In daily life, and particularly in the law, a rhetorician infrequently can state 
an induction with as much certainty as the above example.  Aristotle anticipates 
this when he differentiates a rhetorical induction (an “example”) from a true 
induction.  See Scharffs, supra note xx, at 752 & n.58.  In an example, as in an 
enthymeme, the propositions induced by a representative sampling of species of 
situations (cases or precedents) are asserted to be true to a high degree of 
probability, not certainty. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at 
Book I, ch. 2 at 1356b, Book II, ch. 19 at 1392a–1392b. 
64
 The structural form of pure logic and scientific or mathematical proof is the 
syllogism, while the structural form of rhetorical demonstration and legal 
argument is the enthymeme.  See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at 
Book I, Ch. 1, at 1355a.  In an enthymeme, a highly probable construction of the 
applicable legal principles is applied to a highly probable construction of the 
specific circumstances of the case at hand, so as to describe a highly probable 
conclusion or prediction about the application.  Id. at Book I, ch. 1 at 1355a.  
65
 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 3, 4; Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric 
and Idealogy, supra note xx, at 38–39; Kritzer, supra note xx, at 42–43, 59. 
66
 GEORGE PÓLYA, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS: VOLUME I 
OF MATHEMATICS AND PLAUSIBLE REASONING v–vi (1954); McCloskey, 
Rhetoric of Law and Economics, supra note 4, at 752, 760.  The pros and cons 
of this rhetorical imperative are a lively topic of debate, and one that is growing 
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mathematical forms and structure, this structure of argumentation 
is readily identifiable by audiences, and communicates a proper 
logical structure to support the discourse (rhetoric-2) as well as 
demonstrating internally consistent work of a competent author 
(rhetoric-3). 
Induction can inform the major premise of the deductive 
structure—the process of development of the rules or standards 
through the process of rule synthesis67 and explanatory synthesis.68  
                                                                                                             
in the wake of the economic meltdown of 2009–10.  E.g., Samuel Gregg, Smith 
versus Keynes: Economics and Political Economy in the Post-Crisis Era, 33 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443, 445, 451–52, 455–56 (2010). 
67
 Rule synthesis is a synthesis of authorities found to be on point and 
controlling of a legal question in order to accurately determine and state the 
prevailing law—the rules—that govern a legal issue.  Authorities that control the 
disposition of a legal issue must be reconciled for their explicit statements and 
pronouncements of the governing legal standards as well as examined for 
implicit requirements that are induced from the controlling authorities. See, e.g., 
RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING chs. 10–
13 (5th ed. 2005); DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, 
SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING, REASONING, AND WRITING chs. 4, 6, 9 (3d ed. 
2007); HELENE S. SHAPO, ELIZABETH FAJANS & MARY R. FALK, WRITING AND 
ANALYSIS IN THE LAW ch. 2(IV), ch. 5(III) (4th ed. 1999); Terrill Pollman, 
Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline?  Talking About Legal 
Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 909–10 (2002).  Legal analysis employs 
synthesis of the rules to make a single coherent statement of the applicable legal 
principles that govern the legal issue at hand, and this becomes the “R” (Rule) 
section of the discourse, or the first half of the major premise of the legal 
reasoning syllogism.  MURRAY & DESANCTIS, Legal Writing and Analysis, 
supra note xx, chs. 2, 5, 6. 
68
 Explanatory synthesis, as distinguished from rule synthesis, is a separate 
process of induction of principles of interpretation and application concerning 
the prevailing rules governing a legal issue. The induction is from samples—
namely case law—representing specific situations with concrete facts and in 
which the legal rules have been applied to produce a concrete outcome.  While 
rule synthesis is the component of legal analysis that determines what legal 
standards apply to and control a legal issue, explanatory synthesis seeks to 
demonstrate and communicate how these legal standards work in various 
situations relevant to the legal issue at hand. See MURRAY & DESANCTIS, chs. 6, 
7 (discussing explanatory synthesis); Michael D. Murray, Rule Synthesis and 
Explanatory Synthesis: A Socratic Dialogue Between IREAC and TREAT, 8 
LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC 217 (2011) [hereinafter Murray, Rule Synthesis and 
Explanatory Synthesis]. 
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The deductive structure of the syllogism and enthymeme provides 
the framework for each of the organizational paradigms of legal 
discourse, including IRAC, IREAC, and TREAT.69  The rhetorical 
logos structures of law and economics are a highly recommended 
form for persuasive discourse under modern argument theory and 
the contemporary rhetoric theory of discourse communities.70  This 
use of mathematical structure creates meaning and communicates 
persuasive discourse to each possible audience through level 1, 2, 
and 3 rhetoric. 
2. The Atechnic Pisteis or (Non-Artistic) Modes of Invention and 
Arrangement of Mathematics and Science 
Mathematics and science plays a direct role in contemporary 
legal analysis of facts and data, statistics and reports, documents 
and contracts, sworn testimony (including expert testimony), 
interviews, polls, and surveys—in short, we have come a long way 
in the proper presentation of the atechnic pisteis or (non-artistic) 
modes of invention.  In many areas of law (specific examples 
being antitrust, taxation, and securities law, and the calculation of 
damages in almost every area of contract, tort and property law), 
mathematical analysis informs or constructs the substantive 
element of the action—collusive effect, price manipulation, gains 
                                                 
69
 IRAC stands for Issue–Rule–Application (or Analysis)–Conclusion.  
IREAC stands for Issue–Rule–Explanation–Application–Conclusion.  TREAT 
stands for Thesis–Rule–Explanation–Application–Conclusion.  LINDA H. 
EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION, chs. 10, 
11, 19, 20 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing IREAC and variations for objective and 
persuasive discourse); MURRAY & DESANCTIS, supra note 55, at chs. 2, 6, 7 
(discussing IRAC and TREAT); James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs and 
Professionalism: Legal Writing Professors Can Join the Academic Club, 18 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 711, 719–23 (2006) (discussing IRAC and IREAC); Murray, 
Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, supra note xx; Robbins, Paradigm 
Lost, supra note xx, at 484–87, 492 (discussing IRAC and IREAC). 
70
 The legal writing discourse community has an expectation that the 
syllogistic structures of IRAC, IREAC, or TREAT will be employed, thus the 
rhetorical lesson is not to disappoint this audience with a non-syllogistic 
structure.  See generally Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and 
Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002); Jill J. Ramsfield, Is 
“Logic” Culturally Based? A Contrastive, International Approach to the U.S. 
Law Classroom, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 164–77 (1997). 
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or losses, or damages.  In addition, at a second level of rhetoric, the 
use of scientific and mathematical tools as 
regarding the proof or establishment of elements of the case
surveys, statistical and quantitative analyses of empirical data, 
diagrammatical demonstration, and four
presentation of data
In both categories, the direct proof of damages or an element of the 
case, or the persuasive ordering and presentation of evidence, the 
use is substantive, but it is employed as a language to convince the 
reader of the evidence or proof of th
rhetorical.71   
The use of such methods of persuasion has grown over the 
years:72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chart reports a single search in each decade for figures, charts, 
graphics, and tabular material, and th
control for uses that are proof of elements (such as damages) or 
ordering of data and information for persuasion (e.g., evidence).  
But the point of the chart is that whatever uses are made of figures, 
charts, graphs, or table
                                        
71
 See THOMAS CONLEY
Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor
& Selden, supra note xx
72
 Westlaw search “SHOWN DEPICT! DISPLAY! PICTURED REFER! /4 
FIGURE GRAPH! CHART TABULAR” with date restrictions for each decade, 
e.g., date(>1999) & date(<2010), in ALLCASES and JLR databases.
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topoi for persuasion 
—e.g., 
-quadrant tabular 
—is a well established method of persuasion.  
e proposition, and thus is 
ere is no simple way to 
s, the uses are going up in cases and law 
         
, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 15 (1990); 
, supra note 18, at 118–21; Simpson 
, at 1011. 
 
 
30  [FEBRUARY 2012] 
reviews in each decade, and markedly so in the last two decades in 
law review and journal articles. 
The substantive use of mathematical forms to create meaning 
and communicate understanding is the topic in this section.  The 
more artistic and stylistic use of mathematical forms is discussed in 
the next section. 
3. Rhetoric-3 Uses of Mathematics and Science as a Trope of 
Style  
Style (Latin elocutio; Greek lexis) pertains to the composition 
and wording of the discourse, including grammar, word choice, 
and figures of speech.73  Figures of speech were divided into 
schemes (artful deviations from the ordinary arrangements of 
words), and tropes (creative variations on the meanings of 
words).74  Style is dependent on the speaker, the context and 
setting, and the audience, and the classical rhetoricians made 
recommendations for dividing discourse into one of three levels of 
style:  the low or plain style (Latin infinum or humile; Greek 
ischnos), the purpose of which is to teach the audience, the middle 
style (Latin aequabile or mediocre; Greek mesos), the purpose of 
which is to please the audience, and the grand style (Latin supra or 
magniloquens; Greek adros), the purpose of which is to move the 
audience.75 
The audience and the situation for the discourse are, of course, 
very important to the analysis of the best arguments that can be 
raised,76 so modern argument theory calls for advocates to pay 
                                                 
73
 See generally CORBETT AND CONNORS, supra note 10, at 20, 378; Smith, 
Rhetoric Theory, supra note 7, at 133–34 & n.2 (collecting sources on style in 
classical rhetoric). 
74
 Berger, Law as Rhetoric, supra note 11, at 51 & n.179. 
75
 See generally Frost, Lost Heritage, supra note 17, at 617–18; Frost, Greco 
Roman Legal Analysis, supra note xx, at 188–89;  
76
 Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, supra note 18, at 6–8, 389–92; Greenhaw, 
supra note 8, at 675–80. 
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particular attention to the audience and situation of their 
argument.77   
Mathematical forms (charts, diagrams, four
algebraic formulas) can stimulate thought and imagination, leading 
to rhetoric-3 appreciation of the persuasiveness of the discourse.  
Example 1:78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chart is intended to report “Ratings 
Successful Operations Of A Business In Russia (Among Selected 
Major Brandholders And Trademark Owners Doing Business In 
Russia),” and it is offered to demonstrate that intellectual property 
protection is perceived to be a primary chall
international companies doing business in Russia.
describes the methodology in the following way:  
In the survey, respondents were asked to rate a series of 
“challenges confronting the successful operat
business in Russia
meant “least important
More than one
and trademark owners doing business in Russia gave a 
rating of five to intellectual property pro
intellectual property protection on virtually the same high 
                                        
77
 Smith, Rhetoric Theory
78
 Coalition for Intellectual Property Rights, 
surveys/top50/index.htm
79
 Id. 
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-quadrant tables, 
Of Challenges Facing 
enge confronting 
79
  The author 
 
ions of your 
” using a five-point scale, where one 
” and five meant “most important.”  
-half (52%) of selected major brandholders 
tection.  This ranks 
         
, supra note 7, at 139. 
http://www.cipr.org/activities/
 (last accessed Jan. 25, 2011). 
 
 
 
32 
level of concern as customs (54%) and taxes (52%)
have historically been perceived as presenting the greatest 
challenges to business success in Russia.
Nothing in thi
fact that the author
but the demonstration of the data in a bar graph with a super
imposed variable line graph makes the presentation all the more 
authoritative in 
complicated mathematical formula was applied to data to produce 
this graph. 
Example 2:81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I consider example 2 to be an excellent use of scientific 
charting (taking the form of an informational or 
chart) to make a rhetorical
firearm in Quebec is too complicated.
                                        
80
 Id. 
81
 H. Taylor Buckner, Ph.D., 
of the Law is the Only Excuse
accessed Jan. 25, 2011).
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—which 
80
   
s chart is particularly mathematical except the 
 crunched some numbers to produce the chart, 
a rhetoric-3 sense because it appears that a 
decisional flow 
-3 point:  the procedure for acquiring a 
 
         
Concordia's "Gun Control" Petition: Ignorance 
, http://www.tbuckner.com/IGNOLAW.HTM (last 
 
2] 
-
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Example 3:82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chart discusses the rise and fall of city names in English 
language literature, and claims that this Googl
the results of a search of city names in the vast amount of literature 
that Google has scanned and compiled for searching.
purports to tell us something about “the relative importance of 
different power centers in the public
could have stated (in plain English): when searching for “Paris, 
London, New York, Boston and Rome,” in the scanned English 
literature from 1750 to 2008, interest in London remained steady 
and at a higher level than Paris, Bosto
in New York started at very low point but grew steadily, 
surpassing London in approximately 1910, and continued to rise in 
popularity until 1980, when it began a steady decline.  This would 
have accurately stated the purported f
the information sends a very different rhetoric
                                        
82
 Android6 blog, The Fall and Rise of Twitter in English Literature, 
http://android6.net/the
accessed Jan. 25, 2011).
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. 
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e Lab chart reports 
83
  The chart 
 imagination.”84  The author 
n, and Rome, while interest 
indings, but the graphing of 
-3 message—that 
         
-fall-and-rise-of-twitter-in-english-literature/ (last 
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something scientific was done, and produced the results the readers 
see before them. 
Mathematical forms are a persuasive tool, but the tool is only 
as good as the user, and the user must be careful about proper uses 
in proper situations.  In general legal discourse, the use of law and 
economics mathematical and scientific forms and schemes as an 
artistic or stylistic mode comes with a word of caution that is 
grounded in the very discipline from which the rhetorical use of 
such forms is drawn:  Contemporary law and economics assumes 
and advocates the rhetorical primacy of scientific and 
mathematical methods of analysis in forming hypotheses, 
designing the methods for testing the hypotheses, and analyzing 
the data, statistics, and information collected to test the 
hypotheses.85  Law and economics also assumes the rhetorical 
primacy of scientific and mathematical forms in discourse to 
openly demonstrate the analyses and reveal its theses about human 
behavior for examination and critique.86  The rhetorical power of a 
mathematical proof or a demonstration of a scientific deduction or 
induction lies is the openness and transparency of the 
demonstration.  The premises (major and minor) and the nature of 
the hypothesis induced from the comparison of genus and species 
of data must be fully disclosed and described so as to allow the 
presentation to be analyzed and rebutted.  The assertions made in 
reference to the information displayed must be falsifiable; 
tautological explication (the information is what it is) adds nothing 
to meaning or understanding, and does not contribute to the mode 
of persuasion that points to truth.  At worst, using mathematical 
forms simply to dazzle or confuse the audience or obfuscate the 
relevant information pertinent to the issue is the worst form of 
                                                 
85
 See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 1, at 15–16; Posner, 
Foreword, supra note xx, at 5; Richard A. Posner, Afterword, supra note xx, at 
437.  See also Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Coevolution: The Web 
of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66 
TENN. L. REV. 137, 190 n.493 (1998); Gary Minda, supra note xx, at 611–12. 
86
 See Bryant G. Garth, Strategic Research in Law and Society, 18 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 57, 59 (1990); Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or 
Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 912 (1980). 
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trickery (mere rhetoric, not actual rhetoric). Consider the following 
chart of the Obama Health Care Reform initiative:87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I may be wrong, but I don’t think the intention of the author of this 
chart was to make clear the available options offered under the 
health care reform initiative. 
B. Rhetorical Lessons in Defining Legal Phenomena as Incentives 
and Costs  
This section discusses:  (1) rhetoric-3 uses of incentives and 
costs as a trope of style (i.e., a figure of speech using incentives 
and costs as a metaphor in discourse); and (2) the rhetoric-2 and 
rhetoric-3 concept of incentives and costs in the organization and 
presentation of the discourse as a topic of invention and 
                                                 
87
 Paul Ibrahim, Politics, Economics, and More blog, 
http://www.paulibrahim.com/blog/2009/7/16/get-well-soon-health-care-
bureaucracy-chart.html (last accessed Jan. 25, 2011). 
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arrangement (i.e., the structure and composition of the discourse 
and whether it creates incentives or imposes costs on the reader). 
1. Incentives and Costs as a Rhetoric-3  Trope of Style 
Economics and behavioral science informs legal discourse and 
communication by pointing out that people respond to incentives.  
Contemporary law and economics, informed by the lessons of 
behavioral science, offers a rhetorical perspective on legal 
discourse and communication because the study of persuasion in 
legal communication involves an analysis of what an author 
(speaker, writer, communicator) can do to create incentives to 
attract or motivate the reader (listener, etc.) while avoiding 
imposing costs on the reader. 
A trope is “a deviation from the ordinary and principal 
signification of a word.”88  Metaphor is a trope of style in rhetoric, 
one of the figures of speech described and applied within the canon 
of style.89  Metaphor is one of the “master tropes,” the others being 
metonymy, synecdoche, and irony.90  Numerous disciplines have 
                                                 
88
 EDWARD P.J. CORBETT, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 
461 (1971). 
89
 Professor Stephanie A. Gore defines a metaphor as follows:  
A “metaphor” is defined as a “figure of speech in which a word or 
phrase that ordinarily designates one thing is used to designate another, 
thus making an implicit comparison.”  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000).  A metaphor 
may also be defined as “an implied analogy imaginatively identifying 
one object with another and ascribing to the first object one or more of 
the qualities of the second.”  C. HUGH HOLMAN & WILLIAM HARMON, 
A HANDBOOK TO LITERATURE 298 (5th ed. 1986).  The Princeton 
Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics elegantly defines metaphor as “[a] 
condensed verbal relation in which an idea, image, or symbol may, by 
the presence of one or more other ideas, images, or symbols, be 
enhanced in vividness, complexity, or breadth of implication.”  
PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 490 (Ales 
Preminger ed., enlarged ed., 1974).” 
Stephanie A. Gore,“A Rose By Any Other Name”: Judicial Use of Metaphors 
For New Technologies, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 403, 404–05 (2003), 
90
 BURKE, GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES, supra note 18, at Appx. D.  Burke 
described the master tropes as follows:  For metaphor we could substitute 
perspective; For metonymy we could substitute reduction; for synecdoche we 
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studied the power of metaphor in discourse, including linguistics, 
philosophy, rhetoric, cognitive psychology, and literary theory.91 
Recent literary and cognitive studies of metaphor92 have shown 
that:  
                                                                                                             
could substitute representation; for irony we could substitute dialectic.  Id. 
(emphasis omitted). 
91
 Michael R. Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58 
MERCER L. REV. 919, 919–20 (2007) (citing Linguistics sources:  GEORGE 
LAKOFF, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (with Mark Johnson); GEORGE 
LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL 
ABOUT THE MIND (1987); GEORGE LAKOFF, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A 
FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR (1989) (with Mark Turner); GEORGE 
LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (1996); 
GEORGE LAKOFF, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS 
CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) (with Mark Johnson); GEORGE 
LAKOFF, "DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME 
THE DEBATE” THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR PROGRESSIVES (2004); GEORGE 
LAKOFF, THINKING POINTS: COMMUNICATING OUR AMERICAN VALUES AND 
VISION (2006); Philosophy sources: MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 
(1980) (with George Lakoff); MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON METAPHOR (Mark Johnson ed., 1981); MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE 
MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); 
MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION: IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
FOR ETHICS (1993); MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE 
EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) (with 
George Lakoff); Rhetoric sources: Michael H. Frost, Greco-Roman Analysis of 
Metaphoric Reasoning, in INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A 
LOST HERITAGE 85 (2005); Michael R. Smith, The Power of Metaphor and 
Simile in Persuasive Writing, in ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND 
STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 179, 179 (1st ed. 2002); Cognitive 
psychology sources: STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, 
LIFE, AND MIND (2001); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the 
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988); Steven L. Winter, 
The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative 
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental 
Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1105 (1989); and Literary Theory sources: Michael R. Smith, The 
Functions of Literary References in Persuasive Writing: A Multidisciplinary 
Analysis, in ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING, supra note 11, at 9, 15–30 (discussing 
“Literary References for Nonthematic Metaphoric Comparison”). 
92
 E.g., Michael Frost, Greco-Roman Analysis of Metaphoric Reasoning, 2 
LEGAL WRITING 113, 135–38 (1996) [hereinafter Frost, Greco-Roman 
Metaphor]. 
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Literary analysis and cognitive psychology theory analyze 
the use and effect of metaphors in ways that resemble the 
techniques of their Greco-Roman counterparts. In some 
recent discussions of metaphors' place in legal discourse, 
analysts reject the view that metaphors are merely 
superficial stylistic devices. They assert, with Haig 
Bosmajian, that “it is now well established that the tropes, 
especially the metaphor, are not simply rhetorical flourishes 
used to embellish discourse.”93 Instead, these analysts 
maintain that metaphors are essential devices for achieving 
certain sorts of intellectual insights.  Classical rhetoricians' 
recognized that metaphors provide insights or “fresh 
knowledge”94 that can “scarcely be conveyed”95 by other 
means. Under this view, metaphors become important 
intellectual components of legal analysis rather than mere 
mnemonic or focusing devices.96 
Nevertheless, Judge Cardozo warned that "[m]etaphors in law are 
to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, 
they end often by enslaving it.”97  
The rhetorical path that uses incentives and costs as a metaphor 
for conditions and effects in the law is a well-traveled path in legal 
discourse.98  Every time an author writes about a cost-benefit 
analysis, the use of the term “cost” stands in as a metaphor, a 
rhetorical trope that attempts to transfer the concept of a cost onto 
to the understanding of the actual action or condition described.  
The word “benefit” similarly stands in to communicate a beneficial 
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 Id. (citing HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL 
OPINIONS 441 (1992).  See also Haig Bosmajian, “The Judiciary's Use of 
Metaphors, Metonymies and Other Tropes to Give First Amendment Protection 
to Students and Teachers,” 444 J.L. & EDUC. 443 (1986)). 
94
 Id. (citing ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, supra note 17, at 206). 
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 Id. at 135–37. 
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 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) 
(Cardozo, J.).  Thus, Judge Cardozo used a metaphor (liberation or enslavement 
of thought) to criticize the use of metaphors in law. 
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 Note the metaphor I am using here.  Metaphors are unavoidable in legal 
discourse. 
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meaning to the reader concerning the actual effect or change in 
condition discussed in the discourse.  Every time a change in the 
law is said to “incentivize” certain conduct, the concept of 
“incentive” is a metaphor for the intention of the actor to motivate 
a certain reaction by offering something desired by the recipient.  
Every time a license or permit application process is said to 
provide a “disincentive” to an activity, the term “disincentive” is 
used to convey the negative effects of the condition described in 
the discourse.  Every time a change in procedural rules is said to 
impose an “externality” on the cost of litigation, the author uses 
“externality” as a figure of speech to suggest that the law imposes 
a “cost” that is not internalized by one or more of the parties in the 
discussion.  This is in fact a metaphor within a metaphor—both 
“cost” and “internalize” are used metaphorically in this example.  
By using the terms “incentives” and “costs” metaphorically, 
legal authors can discuss laws and legal conditions as incentives or 
costs in contexts that are not necessarily business or contract 
settings or do not involve the calculation of pecuniary sums or 
damages.99 This expansion in language may improve 
communication—the enlightening aspect of metaphor in discourse.  
Of course, with regard to proper ethos, the recommendation to use 
metaphor in rhetoric-3 applications comes with Judge Cardozo’s 
highly metaphorical warning not to let the metaphor enslave the 
reader’s thinking on the topic. 
                                                 
99
 In many areas of law (specific examples being antitrust, taxation, and 
securities law, and the calculation of damages in almost every area of law), 
mathematical analysis informs or constructs the substantive element of the 
action—collusive effect, price manipulation, gains or losses, or damages.  In 
addition, at the level rhetoric-2, the use of scientific and mathematical tools as 
topoi for persuasion regarding the proof or establishment of elements of the 
case—e.g., surveys, statistical and quantitative analyses of empirical data, 
diagrammatical demonstration, and four-quadrant tabular presentation of data—
is a well established method of persuasion.  In both categories, the direct proof 
of damages or an element of the case, or the persuasive ordering and 
presentation of evidence, the use is substantive, but it is employed in a language 
to convince the reader of the evidence or proof of the proposition, and thus is 
rhetorical.  See, e.g., THOMAS CONLEY, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 
15 (1990); Levine & Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, supra note 18, at 118–
21; Simpson & Selden, supra note xx, at 1011. 
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2. Rhetoric-2 and Rhetoric-3 Incentives and Costs of 
Organization and Presentation of the Discourse as Topics of 
Invention and Arrangement  
The economic rhetorical use of incentives and costs also has 
rhetoric-2 and rhetoric-3 application in the organization and 
presentation of the discourse as topics of invention and 
arrangement (i.e., the structure and composition of the discourse 
and whether it creates incentives or imposes costs on the reader).  
Contemporary law and economics informs contemporary rhetorical 
studies of invention, arrangement, and style adding to the 
knowledge-base of studies of writing as a process and discourse 
community theory.  The rhetorical perspective of economics and 
behavioral science informs the study and understanding of 
effective legal communication by demonstrating the means by 
which an author can create incentives to attract or motivate the 
reader while avoiding imposing costs on the reader.  As one 
example, incentives can be created in legal communication and 
transaction costs can be avoided in legal communication by 
compositional choices made by the author through the use of a 
helpful, reader-oriented organizational paradigm such as the 
TREAT paradigm.100 Incentives can be created and costs can be 
avoided in legal communication by organization of the contents of 
communications into rule formation (rule section) and separate 
explanation of how the rule works (explanation section).101  
Incentives can be created and costs can be imposed in legal 
communication by the method of syntheses of authorities used to 
demonstrate both the legal rules that govern the issue and how 
those legal rules work in actual, concrete situations by the use of 
explanatory synthesis.102 
C.  Rhetorical Use of Efficiency in Legal Discourse 
As specifically applied to the rhetorical canons of invention, 
arrangement, and style, the rhetorical perspective of economics and 
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 MURRAY & DESANCTIS, supra note xx, at ch. 6. 
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 Id.  
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 See Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis, supra note xx_. 
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behavioral science can inform the discussion by demonstrating that 
efficiency supports the persuasiveness of legal discourse.  
1. Rhetoric-3 Use of Efficiency in Invention and Creation of 
Meaning 
Economic or productive efficiency is the application of the 
term “efficiency” that is best known to non-economists.  The 
advice for legal authors seeking rhetoric-3 recognition of the 
meaning of the term when used outside of strict economic analysis 
is to use the term “efficiency” or “efficient” to refer to an 
avoidance of waste, a reduction in costs (transaction costs, 
collateral costs, or externalities), or other savings in time or money 
that have been or would be brought about by a change in the law.  
Saving money or time is nearly universally valued as a goal in life 
and in the law.  Emphasis of efficiency—the phrasing and defining 
of elements of the circumstance in terms of efficiency in the time 
or cost saving sense—is rhetorically valuable.   
2. Rhetoric-2 and Rhetoric-3 Efficiency in Arrangement and Style   
Law and economics advocates elegance and efficiency in the 
form, structure, and composition of economic discourse.  This 
lesson from the canons of law and economics teaches legal authors 
to follow a prescription to make their discourse clear, concise, 
succinct, and elegant in form.  The formal use of the term 
efficiency benefits clarity and promotes comprehension of 
meaning over confusion and frustration.  It opens doors to 
falsifiability because the material is more accessible for analysis 
and criticism if it is clear and succinct.  The door to falsifiability is 
closed by complexity, density, prolixity, and obfuscation in legal 
discourse.  Falsifiable assertions that are not rebutted are highly 
persuasive.   
D. Rhetorical Lessons from Contemporary Rational Choice 
Theory 
The lessons for rhetorical discourse using the definition of 
rational choice in contemporary law and economics have become 
more complicated as our understanding of human behavior grows, 
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but the consequences of the contemporary theories of rational 
choice ultimately coincide with lessons learned from classical 
rhetoric and modern studies of cognition and brain science.  I will 
discuss the rhetorical lessons of contemporary rational choice 
theory in three areas:  (1) rhetoric-1 framing of legal issues to 
respond to biases and heuristics and to situational conditions on 
rational choice as a mode of invention and arrangement; 
(2) rhetoric-2 topics of arrangement and invention (synthesis and 
syllogistic structure) to appeal to the rational audience; and (3) 
rhetoric-3 uses of pathos-centric modes of argument—metaphor, 
parable/mythical/fable forms, character archetypes, and other 
forms of narrative reasoning—as topics of invention and tropes of 
style to address anchoring, endowment effects, and other heuristics 
and biases of legal audiences based on the lessons of pathos from 
modern cognitive studies and brain science. 
1.   The Rhetoric-1 Importance of Framing in Invention and 
Arrangement 
It is challenging to manage the modeling and framing of broad 
concepts such as fairness and justice in economic theory, but the 
rhetorical implications of the empirical observations in law and 
economics, cognitive studies, and brain science reveal that people 
respond to justice and fairness in legal discourse.  These studies 
confirm what has been predicted by the advocates of the modes of 
persuasion of logos, ethos, and pathos.  Arguments framed from a 
more general perspective of how the law and the public policy 
behind the law supports the argument are, of course, a necessary 
part of legal discourse, and a legal author does not need law and 
economics to tell her that. 
Other theories developed through empirical testing of rational 
choice biases and heuristics with a predictable effect on decision-
making, such as the endowment effect, the status quo bias, and 
risk/loss aversion, can be used to frame arguments.  For example, 
if an author combines two lessons from the experiments of 
behavioral science—the experiments indicating that framing of 
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choice matters because decision-making is context-based,103 and 
the experiments indicating that the endowment effect or status quo 
bias plays a strong role in contract negotiation104—creates a 
rhetorical prescription for advocates:  advocates should work to 
carefully and advantageously define the starting point terms of a 
negotiation (which will, as indicated by the experiments, be 
perceived and responded to as the status quo)105 or the status of the 
current law from which the tribunal must move forward to 
adjudicate the client’s matter (which, again, will be perceived as 
the status quo),106 and simultaneously work to frame the choices of 
departure in such a way that the preferred outcome for a client is 
framed as an appropriate compromise choice—not the most 
extreme or most expensive departure from the status quo starting 
positions (as defined by the advocate), but not the smallest 
departure either.107 
2. Rhetoric-1 and Rhetoric-2 Logos Topics of Arrangement and 
Invention (Inductive Synthesis and Syllogistic Structures) for 
the Rational Audience (the Legal Writing Discourse 
Community) 
The overall structure of legal discourse, both in terms of 
invention and arrangement, should be drafted with regard to the 
logos topics of syllogistic structure and inductive synthesis.  The 
rhetoric-1 audience of legal discourse is law-trained readers—the 
legal writing discourse community.  The expectations of this group 
manifestly support using a logical syllogistic structure for the 
overall architecture of the discourse, and the Anglo-American 
theory of precedent and stare decisis support the inductive 
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 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 4, 5 (2000) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS]; Mark Kelman, Yuval 
Rottenstreich, & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal Decision 
Making, in SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra at 61–62, 73–
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 Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics and Contract Law, in SUNSTEIN, 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note xx, at 116–119, 120–121, 136–
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 Id. at 136. 
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 Id. at 137. 
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 Kelman, Rottenstreich, & Tversky, supra note xx, at 74–76. 
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structure of a synthesis of authorities to determine the legal 
standards governing an issue.  The lessons of modern cognitive 
studies and brain science that challenge many of the assumptions, 
premises, and paradigms of traditional rational choice theory in 
law and economics do not wipe the slate clean from the 
expectations of the legal writing discourse community and its basic 
conventions for organization and demonstration.  Even if indirect 
audiences are contemplated, in rhetoric-2 persuasion, the logical 
syllogistic structure is a widely accepted method of demonstration.  
If used properly with appropriate attention to the ethos of the 
discussion, the structure opens up the premises and evidence of the 
discussion to examination and potential criticism or rebuttal.  A 
proper synthesis identifies the species that are examined as well as 
the newly identified genus principles that are induced from the 
species, or it identifies the existing genus principles that are 
applied to the newly identified species of the genus depending on 
which side of the induction the discussion falls.  In short, in 
invention and arrangement, there is no ready substitute for the 
logical syllogistic structure of legal discourse and the inductive 
structure of synthesis.   
3. Rhetoric-3 Rational Choice Lessons Concerning Pathos-Based 
Modes of Persuasion to Address Cognitive and Situational 
Effects on Decision-making 
A significant part of contemporary law and economics’ rational 
choice theory is under examination to challenge the assertion that 
legal decision-makers are autonomous individuals weighing costs 
and benefits in individualistic terms, unaffected by context and 
situation.  Under the traditional and still prevailing doctrine of 
rational choice, rational decision-making should not be affected by 
situation, meaning that choices that maximize the decision-makers’ 
ends should not be affected by situation.  The values and interests 
implicated by a choice may be different from individual to 
individual, but once identified, the choices made in recognition of 
the same values and interests should not change from situation to 
situation.  Cognitive studies and brain science on situational 
decision-making take the opposite tack based on empirical 
evidence and argue that decisions are affected by biases and 
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heuristics that are connected to the context and situation of the 
decision-making.108   
Cognitive studies and brain science have worked a similar 
correction in contemporary rhetoric’s modern argument theory: the 
assumptions and premises of classical and traditional theories of 
rhetoric regarding audience have been refined by modern social 
science and cognitive studies that redefine the concept of the 
rhetorical situation in a way that affects every part of persuasive 
discourse, the audience, the message, and the speaker.109  The 
lessons learned in both contemporary law and economics and 
contemporary rhetoric can inform both disciplines to improve 
theories, predictions, and prescriptions about changes in economic 
analysis of law and legal discourse. 
Situational decision-making often implicates the different 
values that people assign to different choices depending on the 
context and situation in which the decision is to be made,110 and a 
rhetorical examination of values leads to the analysis of 
pathos111—the emotional response to persuasive discourse112—
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because values in contemporary brain science appear to be the 
most important trigger of emotional conviction.113  Contemporary 
                                                                                                             
A. Posner’s First Decade of Dissenting Opinions, 69 MO. L. REV. 73, 158 
(2004).  Quintilian put great stock in emotional appeals, Frost, Ethos, Pathos & 
Legal Audience, supra note xx, at 91, claiming that, “this emotional power . . . 
dominates the court [;] it is this form of eloquence that is queen of all.” 2 
QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA, supra note 17, at 419.  Quintilian, like 
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Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra note xx, at 91.  Over-reliance on the 
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certain emotional reaction to a certain set of facts or a particular logical appeal.  
See id.  An advocate that explicitly announces that he or she will play on the 
audience’s emotions in the presentation of the discourse will inevitably achieve 
the opposite result; the audience, made wary of emotional manipulation, will at 
best steel themselves not to be manipulated and at worst will discount the 
advocate’s presentation on the grounds that the advocate has engaged in trickery 
and subterfuge. See id. at 78–79. Thus, the advocate must not openly play upon 
the audience’s heart strings, but instead must carefully and subtly arrange the 
facts and narrative reasoning of the case in conjunction with the logic and legal 
reasoning of the argument.  See id.; Chestek, supra, at 2, 3, 5, 29–32; Frost, 
Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, supra note xx, at 94. 
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note 11, at 28; Robert F. Blomquist, The Pragmatically Virtuous Lawyer?, 15 
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rhetoric encompasses examination and consideration of the values 
of the audience, as well as their passions and biases, in its study of 
the use of practical reasoning and informal logic, narrative 
reasoning (and its many sub-categories—storytelling, mythical 
forms, parable forms, hero-antihero archetypes), and the schemes 
and tropes of composition in analogical and literary forms (e.g., 
schemes and figures of speech, metaphor theory, and literary 
allusion).114  Contemporary law and economics describes the same 
                                                                                                             
WIDENER L. REV. 93, 114, 133 (2009); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire: 
The Science of Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS 
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evaluate experience of the world, tagging certain facts as useful and valuable 
toward an objective, and rejecting many others.  In decision-making, such as the 
task of jurors, the process involves the somatic marking of evidence for its 
salience toward the decision, winnowing down the possible choices and their 
consequences based on the somatic marker (loosely characterized as a "gut 
feeling") assigned to the evidence. (Contemporary legal economists and 
behavioral scientists would characterize this as the application of affect 
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type of phenomena as biases and heuristics—anchoring, status quo 
bias, endowment effect bias, risk/loss aversion, representativeness 
heuristic, availability heuristic, and probability assessment 
dysfunctionality.115 Contemporary rhetoric applies cognitive 
studies and brain science to inform the predictions of audience 
reaction and motivation produced by the use of certain topics of 
invention or tropes of style,116 much in the same way that 
contemporary law and economics looks to cognitive studies and 
brain science for the same lessons in audience reaction and 
motivation.117 
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There are two rhetorical lessons to be drawn from this 
observation:  first, that a single rhetorical approach to discourse 
may miss the audience and fall short of the rhetorical situation.  
Discourse should be crafted in layers, and by this I do not simply 
mean the rhetoric-1, -2, or -3 levels pertaining to different 
audiences, but rather the use of multiple layers using different 
modes of persuasion directed toward the same audience for the 
same level of rhetorical communication; second, that a writer 
should consider pathos-based modes of persuasion, such as 
narrative theory and storytelling modes to target the values of the 
audience in the situation and present discourse that the audience 
will identify and accept, perhaps not as the sole mode of 
persuasion, but as one layer in the communication. 
CONCLUSION 
The rhetorical canons of law and economics are tools for legal 
discourse, not universal goals and not perfect solutions.  Law and 
economics provides a rhetorical lens through which a legal author 
might examine and improve the persuasiveness of her discourse.  
But a lens, like any other tool, is only as good as its user.  The 
critics of the role of neoclassical law and economics in removing 
or blocking restraints on and limiting measures to oversee the 
American financial markets and banking system118 give us a 
sobering reminder that law and economics rhetoric can be used to 
persuade highly intelligent, lawyers, judges, academics, legislators, 
and government officials to allow and even to put into place 
conditions that precipitated the most severe economic crisis since 
the Great Depression. 
Modern and contemporary rhetoric has advanced and improved 
upon the basic perceptions of human behavior and knowledge of 
human nature of the ancient rhetoricians, but the more complex 
models of reasoning in contemporary rhetoric have not replaced 
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the classical rhetorical concept of ethos.  Contemporary rhetoric 
has learned lessons from cognitive studies and brain science that 
confirm the importance of the classical rhetorical concept of pathos 
and the necessity that rhetoric examine the values of the audience 
in the rhetorical situation so as to anticipate the emotional reaction 
of the audience to the discourse.   Similar lessons are being learned 
in contemporary law and economics as brain science and cognitive 
studies add to our “understanding of understanding” and motivate 
our study of motivation, adding to the behavioral science that seeks 
to improve the designing of incentives in the face of new 
conceptions of rational choice.  Each discipline can learn lessons 
from the other about the motivation and persuasion of different 
audiences in different situations. 
Contemporary rhetoric can learn much from the new school of 
contemporary rhetoric, law and economics.  Efficiency, when used 
in appropriate ways in appropriate rhetorical situations, can 
improve discourse in style, arrangement, and invention.  The 
expression of legal conditions and legal effects in the language of 
incentives and costs inspires imagination that allows better 
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of laws and 
legal policy; its widespread acceptance in the law is only further 
evidence of the rhetorical power of the language across many areas 
of the law and many legal situations.  The persuasiveness of 
mathematics and science extends to their forms and the substance 
of their proofs, and the use of the methods and forms may create 
meaning and inspire imagination that improves comprehension and 
understanding.  The forms of mathematics and science can 
promote clarity and open demonstration, permitting examination of 
the workings of the discourse and promoting the opportunity for 
falsification and rebuttal.    
The rhetorical tools of law and economics are powerful, but not 
universally persuasive.  A topic of invention is a single place to 
find a method of argumentation, not the only place.  Many 
audiences will not respond to mathematical and scientific forms, 
especially if they are used to attempt to avoid a primary question of 
fairness or justice. The intuitive uses of efficiency in form 
(elegance, openness, and clarity) and in the elimination of costs 
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and waste may be widely persuasive, but other economic rhetorical 
turns on efficiency (Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) are best 
left to rhetoric-1 discourse of economists.  Incentives and costs is a 
language, and many rhetorical situations accept this language, but 
the general application must fit the topic and the situation; simply 
identifying something as an incentive or a cost will not be 
persuasive if the audience or the situation demands a different 
topos for argument or a more apt trope of style.   
The ethos of the speaker remains critical in the rhetoric of law 
and economics.  Many of the sharpest and deepest criticisms of 
contemporary economics, many of which were stated well before 
the Great Recession, have asserted that mathematical and scientific 
methods of daunting complexity are used in law and economics to 
hide the workings of the reasoning, not to promote understanding 
or persuasion.  The method is not rhetoric but a resort to the 
cudgel, used to overpower the audience with coercion not 
persuasion.  The formula might hide the workings of the reasoning 
rather than openly demonstrate the reasoning for falsification or 
rebuttal, all under an implied challenge and a dare to rebut the 
force of such a powerful device.  Charts and diagrammatics may be 
used to distract the audience or trick them into believing a 
mathematical or scientific analysis was performed to produce the 
assertions made in the rhetoric, when little or no math or science 
was involved.  Quantitative analysis may crunch data the true 
meaning of which is buried in the assumptions made that chose 
what data to collect and what to exclude, and in the premises 
drawn from the assumptions that determined the possible 
conclusions that could be drawn from the experiment or analysis.   
Law and economics relies on mathematics and science, 
efficiency, incentives and costs, and rational choice theory for 
rhetoric-1 communication with legal economists, but often uses the 
same topics and tropes as powerful props in rhetoric-2 and 
rhetoric-3 communication with lawmakers and policy-makers—
again, rightly or wrongly according to the ethos of the speaker and 
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the communication.119  The canons of law and economics rhetoric, 
like the canons of the other schools of contemporary rhetoric, may 
be employed to promote effective communication for the purpose 
of persuasion, or be used as mere rhetoric, to distract, confuse, 
obfuscate, or coerce the audience.  This is a lesson for all 
rhetoricians, those of law and economics and of general legal 
discourse, made all the more clear by the example of the use of the 
rhetoric of law and economics in ways that helped to bring about 
the Great Recession. 
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 My colleague, David Herzig, summarized this lesson by repeating the apt 
comment, “Statistics never lie—but liars use statistics.” 
